South Korea threatens sanctions. North Korea responds by threatening all-out war.  Will this dispute escalate into a militarized conflict?


My guess is that South Korea won't back down because they are highly resolved; South Korea's decision to threaten sanctions despite anticipating North Korea's response beforehand indicates their high resolve. In addition, with local and provincial elections coming up, backing down from their threat would incur audience costs. 

Whether or not North Korea backs down is less clear. On one hand, you could argue that North Korea has a history of rhetorical responses thus they could be just bluffing. On the other hand, with North Korea's recent domestic problems and instability such as the failed currency reform and rumors of Kim Jong-il's health issues, Kim may want to show a more hard-line approach. 

To assess and predict whether this dispute escalates or not, a more sophisticated argument that incorporates extended immediate deterrence may be needed. Right now the US and Japan seem to be willing to back up South Korea. Therefore, North Korea will need to consider the costs of facing the two states when deciding whether to follow through its threat. China's position is less clear. China has defended North Korea in they past, but currently they are only urging restraint by both sides. Without the backing of China, escalation would less likely be a success for North Korea.

Finally, you could also challenge the unitary actor assumption and say that perhaps, hypothetically, Kim Kong-il's regime has weakened to a point that he doesn't have full control of his military. Military Hawks may be behind the torpedo attack and when North Korea really gets sanctioned, they may press for military escalation or even start a coup. However, it's highly unlikely that we'll be able to get information to confirm this explanation.

After reading Akerlof and Kranton's new article about identity economics, why do I seem to get the impression that the state of political science is more advanced than economics?

... But in most economic analysis, the decision makers’ point of view is quite narrow. It starts with what people like and don’t like. People may have a taste for oranges or bananas, or a preference for enjoying life today instead of saving for the future. They then decide what to buy or how much to save, given prevailing prices, interest rates, and their own income. Economists have included in such analysis that people interact with others, but they have largely treated such social interactions in a mechanical fashion, as if they were commodities.

...When we examine people’s decisions from the perspective of their identities and social norms, we get new answers to many different economic questions. Who people are and how they think of themselves is key to the decisions that they make. Their identities and norms are basic motivations. We call this approach identity economics.

They are basically saying that the majority of the economic discipline have treated preference as exogenous. This reminds me of two big debates in the field of international relation in the 90s. First, liberalism's challenge to realism. For example, Andrew Moravcsik's argument that realists tend to treat state preferences as exogenous and that we should instead look at national characteristics and how state preferences vary. Second, constructivism's challenge to rationalism. For example, Alexander Wendt's argument of how norms and identity shape the interests and behavior of actors. Or Peter Katzenstein's argument of how culture and identity affects national security.

To me, political science seems to be quicker to admit and face the weakness of rationalism and its assumptions.